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Zombie law:  
conjugality, annulment, and the (married) living dead 
Conventional warfare is useless against these creatures, as is conventional 
thought. ... Ignorance is the undead’s strongest ally, knowledge their 
deadliest enemy. 
The Zombie Survival Guide (Brooks, 2003, xiii) 
In a 2001 interview, Ulrich Beck complained that longstanding sociological structures 
were becoming archaic. Tagging them ‘zombie categories’, Beck described a number of 
institutional fields which, he said, ‘govern our thinking but are not really able to capture 
the contemporary milieu’ (Beck 2001, 262). Beck asserts that these zombie categories 
need to be reshaped and re-imagined—not just deconstructed and criticised. One of the 
examples he offers is ‘the household’—a category which, he says, remains foundational 
despite having changed radically in recent times. Beck suggests that reimagining the 
household—and the family—must begin by reconceptualising ‘the couple’ in ways that 
resonate with contemporary personal and social practices (Beck and Beck-Gersheim 
2002, 204; Budgeon and Roseneil 2004, 127). While it departs from Beck in many ways, 
this article undertakes a kind of social archaeology whose aim is broadly consistent with 
Beck’s imperative. The subject of critique and reconstruction is, specifically, the married 
heterosexual couple as constructed in law. Marriage, it will be argued, is something of a 
zombie category.1 This is in no way equivalent to arguing that marriage is dying out: 
1 Beck’s zombie categories are somewhat different from the living dead populating Henry A. 
Giroux’s marvellous (2010) essay. While I can see a place for Giroux’s ‘carnival of snarling 
creatures engorging elements of human anatomy’ (2010, 1) here, its relevance pertains mostly to 
marriage promotion programs in the United States, and their specious equation of marriage with 
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zombies are, by definition, the living dead. Against Beck, my question centres less on 
how sociological categories might be reinvented or revived so much as what animates 
the sociologically undead. Everyone knows that it is notoriously difficult to dispatch a 
zombie (Brooks 2003). The usual advice is to attack the brain (How to Kill a Zombie 
2009). In what follows, however, I will suggest an alternative target. My contention is 
that a particular kind of social-sexual magic keeps marriage from its grave: a magic I 
call ‘sexual performativity’.  
 
In this article, the legal skeleton of civil annulment, or nullity of marriage (as it 
is also known), will be examined. In particular, the discursive bones of the requirement 
to consummate, and the sexual dimorphism it has both assumed and produced, will be 
scrutinised. Even though marriage as such has spawned a proliferation of scholarly 
research concerning sexualities, government, culture and justice, some elements remain 
markedly under-researched. The regulation of conjugality more broadly—including 
marriage, divorce, cohabitation, ascriptive marriage, civil unions, and so on—is the 
subject of widespread scholarly attention, but very few scholars attend to how conjugal 
relationships are brought into being. Even those that do (Clarke et al. 2013; Freeman 
2002; Geller 2001; Ingraham 1999; Montemurro 2006; Otnes and Pleck 2003; Stychin 
2006) tend to focus on questions of bridal culture and/or queer subversions of 
heteronormative wedding culture more than regulatory mechanisms and effects. Such 
cultural questions revolve around objects and practices associated with weddings—
investigating wedding narratives, food, clothes, preparations and celebrations, for 
example. These studies are interesting and useful, and taken together bring the very 
meaning of weddings into question, such that it is no longer always or entirely self-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
social/moral benefits (see also Smart 2007, 13). These considerations are deferred for treatment 
in a future paper. 
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evident what a wedding is. To be clear: in this article, I use the term ‘wedding’ to refer to 
the establishment of a marriage relationship, a process governed through the regulation 
of (living) bodies.  
 
Rules and regulations informing weddings are particularly interesting because in 
some places (including Australia) they stand in sum as that which distinguishes 
marriage from other forms of conjugality. Where cohabitation is afforded the same or 
very similar rights and responsibilities (or threats and promises, perhaps) as marriage, 
weddings and their effects loom as objects of considerable curiosity. Current scholarly 
and public debate is firmly centred on the justness of extending marriage to gay and 
lesbian couples (Marsh 2011; Browne 2011; Moskowitz et al. 2010; Rimmerman and 
Wilcox 2007; inter alia). This attention is warranted. My contention runs parallel rather 
than counter to this, and suggests that in the regulation of weddings—that is, in the 
rules governing the making of a valid marriage—we see more than homophobic 
exclusion. In the regulation of weddings, the privileging of heterosex over other modes of 
desire is certainly evident, but we can also see heteronormativity’s anxious demarcation 
of ‘men’ and ‘women’ at precisely the moment of their naturalisation (Beasley et al. 
2012, ch. 2). In the same way that we might, after Foucault, examine reason by 
considering the asylum, or study freedom by interrogating incarceration, perhaps there 
is something to be gleaned about the regulatory schema of wedding by investigating 
annulment. The argument to be aired, here, is that while annulment (and its historical 
connection to the notion of consummation) may be a rotting legal creature, its footprints 
continue to emboss the legal palimpsest of conjugality.  
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Annulment  
 
Annulment is one of three routes by which a marriage might be dissolved. Divorce can 
be readily conceptualised as an arterial road to dissolution; death is (these days) more of 
a by-way; and annulment is the road less travelled. In simple terms, while divorce 
declares that a valid marriage has ended, annulment affirms that a purported marriage 
is not truly so. Marriage entails relations of status: “[t]he annulment suit is an attempt 
to secure judicial recognition for the fact that the status of husband and wife has never 
existed between the parties” (Crane 1948, 571). Governments and churches began 
stipulating certain requirements for a valid wedding ceremony in the sixteenth century 
in Europe, and the mid-eighteenth century in England (Coontz 2005, 106). 
Contemporary regulations concerning annulment have their roots in canon law, and the 
availability of annulment remains important in several religious traditions—including, 
notably, the Roman Catholic Church. In the mid-nineteenth century, however, authority 
to grant decrees of dissolution shifted from ecclesiastical to civil courts (Hasson 2009, 2), 
and it is those civil law regulations that form the focus of this article. As we will see, a 
range of irregularities (including mistakes and other complications) can render a 
wedding ceremony void.2  Rules and regulations concerning annulment constitute the 
legal mechanisms for determining the validity of marriage, and at their heart are 
performative utterances.  
                                                          
2 Purported marriages may be ‘valid, void, non-existent or presumed’ (Probert 2002, 399). 
Distinctions are also made between ‘void’ and ‘voidable’ marriages, the complexities of which are 
not especially germane to the present discussion—suffice to note that a void marriage is deemed 
to have never constituted a marriage at all, while a voidable marriage is one that can be 
understood to have existed up until its nullification (Cretney and Masson 1997, 39-40; Goda 
1967; Hall 1971; Passingham and Harmer 1985, 46). 
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Weddings deploy speech acts and performative utterances. Performative 
utterances are those speech acts which accomplish some feat: they are not descriptive; 
they are not subject to tests of truth (Austin 1962). Rather, performative utterances 
(attempt to) accomplish something, and so ‘succeed’ or ‘fail’. As linguistic philosopher 
John Searle puts it: ‘I can’t paint the roof by saying “I paint the roof” but I can promise 
to come and see you just by saying “I promise to come and see you”,’ (Searle 1989, 535). 
Uttering a promise brings that promise into existence. Thus, a performative utterance is 
a kind of discursive magic whose chief characteristic is to bring into being that which it 
names. Arrest, for example, is brought into being as a police officer says “You’re under 
arrest”. Resignation is effected as the words “I quit!” are spoken. A teenager’s social 
privileges are suspended as the words “You’re grounded!” are uttered (or yelled). 
Naming, betting, promising, declaring: all of these are classic performative utterances. 
Often, wedding vows—the “I do”s that turn a groom into a husband, a bride into a wife—
are presented as a kind of archetypal performative utterance (Austin 1962; Rossi 2011; 
Parker and Sedgwick 1995). Wedding vows are no doubt one of the most frequent 
performative utterance, but the more telling archetype, in my view, is the magician’s 
“Abracadabra!” Suspending disbelief, the rabbit appears from the hat, the coin vanishes, 
the bisected assistant is rendered whole again—seemingly on the strength of a word. We 
know, however, that these magical events are effects; we know that the magician 
produces these transformations not by the word but by other more pedestrian means—a 
trick sleeve, a cunningly placed mirror, and so on. “Abracadabra” is an especially 
illustrative performative utterance, in my view, because it invites us to consider the 
circumstances of its performative production along with its apparent effects. To borrow 
Sara Ahmed’s apt phrase, it brings the work behind ‘the magic of arrival’ to our 
attention (Ahmed 2006, 555). 
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Like the magician’s “abracadabra”, all performative utterances are buttressed by 
conventions; for any trick to succeed, the thing must be properly set up. Flinging off 
one’s apron and shouting “That’s it, I quit!” fails as a performative utterance if it is 
uttered in a restaurant at which the speaker is not actually employed; parental or some 
similar authority is required to effect a grounding; only an attending umpire (and not a 
spectator, for example) can dismiss a cricketer. Performative utterances succeed or fail 
according to their regulatory or conventional circumstances. In the case of wedding 
vows, the conventions required for the performative “I do” to work are set out in law; 
typically, in various Marriage Acts. Such legislation itemises the kinds of problems or 
irregularities that might invalidate a wedding ceremony and void the marriage 
purportedly effected. Different rules apply in different times and places, and are 
categorised in various ways. In what follows, I consider several broad categories of 
grounds for annulment as they have operated in England and Wales, Australia, and (to 
a lesser extent) the United States. Some version of the kind of problem outlined in each 
category is (or was) common to virtually all jurisdictions drawing on the English 
tradition, but such regulations are by no means uniform. In the United States, for 
example, marriage is in most instances a matter for State rather than federal law, and 
variation thus occurs. In the United States, Australia, and in the related jurisdictions of 
England and Wales, the relevant contexts of marriage law more generally were similar 
until the mid-1970s, when divorce reforms, policy decisions, and social change began to 
re-shape national conjugality in somewhat different ways. Today, wedding irregularities 
can be grouped into several broad categories of complication: mistakes relating to the 
ceremony; problems pertaining to consent of the parties marrying; problems of 
disclosure; and prohibited pairings. Each of these categories has continuing implications 
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and effects relating to the regulation of contemporary marriage, and these will be 
identified later. Taken together, grounds for annulment can be summarised as follows.  
 
 
Wedding ‘Fail’ 
 
Potential for annulment arises where a wedding ceremony is improperly performed. 
Just as the performative utterance of sentencing would fail if anyone other than a judge 
in a court of law utters it, so weddings must be officiated only by those vested with the 
power to do so: typically, ministers of religion or civil celebrants. Whether a celebrant is 
properly authorised to perform a wedding is, however, less important than the bride and 
groom’s belief that the person marrying them is qualified to do so (Masson et al. 2008, 
18, 36). Thus, when it turned out that Virginian ‘Father O’Brian’ was in fact Father 
O’Fraud and not an ordained Catholic priest at all (Arlington County Public Affairs 
Division 2006), there was never any question concerning the validity of weddings at 
which he had presided, because all parties married by him believed that he was 
authorised to do so. If either bride or groom were aware, however, that the person 
marrying them was not entitled to do so, the resultant (purported) marriage might be 
annulled. Errors amounting to grounds for annulment might also arise if the wedding 
ceremony fails to comply with the marriage law of the country in which it is celebrated. 
Thus, when it turned out that celebrity couple Mick Jagger and Jerry Hall’s 1990 
Balinese wedding did not comply with Indonesian formalities, the couple had grounds 
for their putative marriage to be annulled (Oldham 2000; Roe 2007). Such errors are 
patently rare. Moreover, as Rebecca Probert points out, judicial interpretation of rules 
governing the existence or non-existence of marriage has been inconsistent (Probert 
2002). Probert’s exploration of a number of cases determining whether particular unions 
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were “valid, void, non-existent or presumed” concludes by marking such considerations 
as “the legacy of the eighteenth [century]” (Probert 2002, 419).  
 
These days, weddings have taken on a range of meanings additional to the 
establishment of a lawful conjugal relationship. They are occasions of consumption and 
celebration; they are cultural artefacts with magnetic—even ‘magical’—narratives 
(Otnes and Pleck 2003; Brook 2011). Wedding culture seems to spread like a kind of 
social contagion, giving rise to what Suzanne Leonard calls “marriage envy” (Leonard 
2006; Brook 2011). It might be argued that, given widespread social acceptance of 
cohabitation, weddings do not necessarily mark the change in status they once did. It is 
no longer so necessary to celebrate the beginning of a couple relationship by 
participating in a formal ceremony, let alone a ceremony whose shape and content must 
be endorsed and registered by the state. Nevertheless, rules pertaining to the 
celebration of marriage remain.3 For example, it is not permissible to marry outdoors in 
England (Masson et al. 2008, 30). While it is hard to imagine how flouting the rules by 
holding a garden wedding should constitute grounds for annulment, any rules 
concerning how a couple relationship must be launched seem faintly ridiculous where 
the state also makes determinations about whether or not couple relationships exist on 
normative or ascriptive grounds (Harder 2007). Regulations specifying that cohabiting 
couples must be considered ‘married’ for certain purposes—most notably relative to 
welfare payments—suggest that rules concerning the formalities associated with 
                                                          
3 At the time of writing, bona fide marriage has just been extended to gay and lesbian couples in 
England and Wales, and is already available in a number of the United States. In Australia, the 
idea that marriage might be appropriate for same-sex couples was explicitly rejected by the 
Howard government, but remains an issue of public and political debate (Marsh 2011). 
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weddings are indeed becoming archaic. Problems concerning the consent of parties to a 
marriage are similarly troublesome. 
 
 
Consent ‘fail’ 
 
A complex category of regulatory problems attaching to weddings centres on consent. If 
a person is forced to marry under duress, for example, the validity of their marriage 
might be called into question. Historically, such duress has had to be immediate and 
severe (Buckland v. Buckland 1965). It is sometimes claimed that the threat to the 
person claiming compromised consent must be external: the fears of the party 
purporting to have acted under duress cannot be a consequence of some situation of 
their own making (Finlay 1980, but see Masson et al. 2008, 71 for a competing view). 
This means that what is colloquially called a ‘shotgun wedding’—in which the father of a 
pregnant bride marches her boyfriend into church with a metaphorical rifle behind the 
boy’s back—has not usually been deemed to invalidate the groom’s consent, because the 
duress in such cases is said to have been of the groom’s own making, and because the 
‘shotgun’ is merely metaphorical. If the shotgun were real, the story would be different: 
in an American case, Lee v. Lee (1928), a putative marriage in which “if there had not 
been a wedding there would have been a funeral” was deemed void (Cretney and Masson 
1997, 63).  
 
 More recently, the issue of consent has attracted attention in relation to forced 
marriages. As Anne Phillips and Moira Dustin explain, in distinguishing forced and 
arranged marriage, consent is pivotal: 
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In an arranged marriage, the family takes a leading role in the selection 
of partner, but the potential spouse always retains the right to say no; in a 
forced marriage, there is no choice (Phillips and Dustin 2004, 534). 
This distinction has required movement away from what they describe as an ‘over-
simple dichotomy between coerced and consensual marriage’ (2004, 534) and instead 
invites the kind of continuum conceptualised by Sundari Anitha and Aisha Gill (2009), 
in which broader yet highly nuanced understandings of coercion can be considered. 
Coercion and consent have been crucial elements in a range of feminist scholarship, and 
are particularly important in relation to rape—and to heterosexual relations ‘under 
conditions of patriarchy’ (169) more broadly. The value of Anitha and Gill’s analysis is 
not just their recognition that the issue of forced marriage is as much about violence 
against women as it is ‘about’ ways of organising marriage, but also that they highlight 
the effects of presenting forced marriage as consensual marriage’s polar opposite. Such 
polarisation results in a white/western style of consensual marriage being idealised as 
liberated and progressive, while arranged and forced marriage are bundled together as 
the preserve of another (more patriarchal, less modern) culture.4 This opposition and 
alignment (where white-western consensual marriage is opposed to ‘other’ forced or 
arranged marriage) obfuscates both the space between, where consent and coercion are 
intertwined, and leaves the racist-colonialist axel at the centre of such oppositions 
undisturbed.  
 
Complex problems relating to consent also arise where a party to a purported 
marriage is a person whose capacity to consent is more generally compromised. Such 
parties include children; some people with intellectual disabilities (Bartlett 2010; Doyle 
                                                          
4 On the significance of this move in more general terms, see Hindess (2007). 
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2010; Hasson 2010; Gaffney-Rhys 2006; Barker and Fox 2010); people in the grip of 
psychosis (Hasson 2009) and so on. Similar restrictions have extended to wards of the 
state or people under government ‘care’, resulting in contentious and sometimes racist 
rulings. In 1950s Australia, for example, Indigenous people were routinely declared 
wards of the state, and were subject to intrusive surveillance and paternalistic 
directives concerning whom they might marry, along with a raft of other proscriptions 
(Brook 1997; Riggs 2011). The complexities of these and more contemporary cases must 
be set aside for the time being. 
 
Mistaken identity is another complication of consent. If Seymour believes he is 
marrying Patti but in fact weds her identical twin sister Selma, for example, the 
marriage of Seymour and Selma is voidable. Mistakes of this kind are very rare indeed. 
Mistakes concerning the true character, feelings, habits, or fortunes of one’s spouse are 
undoubtedly much more common (if not the norm) but do not, in general, offer grounds 
for annulment. Rather, the expectation is that where a person is a willing party to a 
wedding ceremony, the onus is on each party to ascertain the true nature, history, and 
fortunes of their prospective spouse (Finlay 1980). ‘Identity’, here, means the person as 
known to the other party. Australian legal historian Henry Finlay explains that as a 
general rule, if a person means to marry Charles Brown, and the person they marry is 
the person known to them as Charles Brown, there can be no mistake of identity, 
regardless of how Charles Brown might have represented or misrepresented himself to 
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his bride.5 Identity, then, is firmly corporeal. A unique Australian case, Re the Marriage 
of C and D (1979), confirms this. 
 
The petitioner in this case was a woman who had been putatively married for 
over ten years. In 1979 she sought a declaration of nullity on the grounds of mistaken 
identity (Finlay 1980; Otlowski 1990, Bailey 1979). Though the person with whom she 
exchanged wedding vows was indeed the person she meant to marry, she alleged that 
the groom was not, in fact, a man. This, she said, constituted a mistake of identity: she 
thought she had exchanged vows with a man. Evidence presented to the court showed 
that the husband was intersexed—or what medical experts of the day termed a ‘true 
hermaphrodite.’6 Though recorded at birth as being a boy, the husband had 
characteristics of both sexes: one teste, one ovary, a penis, and breasts. In order to bring 
his body into greater conformity to his identity as a man, he underwent several 
operations prior to marrying, of which the wife knew nothing. The judge ruled that their 
putative marriage was null and void on two grounds. One of these concerned the 
requirement that marriage be the union of a man and a woman—an issue to which I will 
return. But in the first instance, Justice Bell confirmed that this was a case of mistaken 
identity. The wife’s belief that she had married a man was, (according to Bell, at least), 
mistaken. Finlay questions this decision, arguing that the case should not have been 
decided as a matter of mistaken identity: after all, the wife married the person she 
                                                          
5 In the United States, ‘fraud’ has sometimes been interpreted more broadly, and offers grounds 
for annulling a marriage wherever a person marries in ignorance of anything which, had they 
known it, would have caused them to break off their engagement (Gordon 1986; Tucker 1991). 
6 Such terminology is now usually considered offensive. See Chau and Herring (2002) for a 
comprehensive explanation of the range of intersex conditions, and Preves (2000) and Turner 
(1999) for discussion of the sociology of sex/gender and intersexuality.  
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meant to. However, one might counter that this ‘mistake’ did not pertain to the 
husband’s fortune, history, or character. The mistake, if we can call it that, was 
corporeal, and relied on there being some question as to the match between the 
husband’s body and his identity. 
 
Marriage continues to entail various rights and responsibilities, and as such 
demands explicit consent (Pateman 1980). However, in England and Wales, Australia, 
and most of the United States, a spouse who no longer wishes to continue a matrimonial 
relationship is not obliged to remain married. Wherever no-fault divorce is available 
unilaterally, spouses are not bound by each other’s behaviour, as once they were; rather, 
their consent remains more or less permanently contingent (Brook 2007). While there 
are, of course, situations today in which couples are pressured or coerced into marrying, 
and this may be a deeply traumatic experience for the parties concerned, such coercion 
is largely extrinsic to the legal effects of marriage. Thus, the idea that a person’s consent 
to be married is paramount to the validity and voidability of marriage is rendered 
somewhat less crucial. It is, perhaps, just as significant that where states ascribe 
conjugality—for example, by making determinations as to whether a person receiving 
sole parent welfare payments is in a ‘marriage-like’ relationship or not—a couple can be 
deemed to be ‘married’ without their consent (Harder 2009, 643). Thus, while cohabiting 
couples may be free to end their relationship at any moment, they are not necessarily at 
liberty to define the terms of their relationship relative to the state for themselves. As 
Lois Harder observes, the state may recognise and ascribe a relationship status 
explicitly rejected by the parties to that relationship (Harder 2009, 644). Consent, it 
seems, is a technical requirement of marriage, but not conjugality more broadly.  
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Disclosure ‘fail’ 
 
A category of annulment closely related to mechanisms of consent concerns people who 
might marry validly only so long as they disclose a particular corporeal condition. A 
bride pregnant to someone other than her groom is required to disclose this to her 
prospective spouse if she wishes to avoid the risk of future annulment. (A groom who 
has impregnated a woman other than his bride tends not to be similarly constrained.) 
Similar rules of disclosure have applied to prospective spouses suffering from sexually 
transmitted diseases and certain other conditions. In the United States at the end of 
World War II, many jurisdictions required couples planning to marry to undergo a blood 
test for this reason, and in a handful of States this remains the case. Likewise, anyone 
suffering from an ‘incurable’ mental illness, and who did not disclose this to their 
prospective spouse, offered grounds for their putative marriage to be annulled. 
‘Incurable mental illness’ seems to have included epilepsy, in some places, but the same 
rule seems not to have applied in relation to other chronic or terminal conditions (such 
as late-stage cancer, for example). These concerns with disclosure of mental illness, 
pregnancy, and sexually transmitted disease expose the way that marriage, as a sexual 
relationship, is constructed as fundamentally wholesome.7 In its construction as 
                                                          
7 It also speaks to the association of human reproduction and marriage, in that these provisions 
may be said to clear the ground for the procreation of healthy progeny. This reproductive aspect 
cannot be completely detached from the construction of marriage as ‘wholesome’, but neither does 
it stand as a simple synecdoche. If the desire for a healthy heir were sufficient explanation for 
these provisions, we might expect tests for fertility and requirements to disclose infertility to 
feature more prominently, (and perhaps we might expect to see requirements to disclose any 
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certifiably ‘clean’, marriage is set up in opposition to ‘perversion’, and bears the 
discursive weight of ‘healthy’ intimacy, whether or not health and well-being are 
necessary corollaries to marriage (Bernard 1972; Herdt and Kertzner 2006; Koball et al., 
2010). It also suggests that in legal-discursive constructions of conjugality, the body is 
assumed to be capable of both concealing and revealing truths about identity. 
 
Disclosure has continuing relevance in relation to couple formation, whether that 
couple is married or ‘partnered’, different- or same-sex. For Anthony Giddens (1992) and 
others, self-confession is a defining feature of the ‘pure relationship’—it is part of the 
same pattern of relationship formation that is characterised as impermanent and 
individualised. Disclosure, here, is usually thought to involve the establishment or 
enjoyment of intimacy associated with talk about deep or even secret feelings (Holmes 
2010, 7). Disclosure, or ‘deep and intimate revelations about one’s most authentic, but 
most hidden, core’ (Smart 2009, 552) is claimed by Giddens to be the marker of an 
especially contemporary mode of intimacy. But, as the discussion above illustrates, 
disclosure is by no means a novel feature of present-day relationships, and has in fact 
been enduringly and explicitly articulated to marriage. As we have seen, disclosure of 
particular corporeal conditions is specifically connected to the establishment of a valid 
marriage. Moreover, the kinds of facts requiring disclosure in order to avoid the risk of 
nullity remain uncomfortably consistent over time, even where relevant corporeal 
technologies and mores have changed. It may be that there is, today, a much broader 
social acceptance of transgendered and transsexual people, for example, than in earlier 
times (Probert 2005; Re Kevin 2001; Sharpe 2009). However, where a transsexual person 
marries in their ‘new’ sex without first confessing their history of sexual identity to their 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
inheritable disease, as well). As it is, inability to consummate has been available as a ground for 
annulment, but inability to conceive or impregnate has not.  
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spouse, they risk contracting a voidable marriage (Sharpe 2012; Masson et al. 2008, 77; 
Sandland 2003).8 That is, having a trans history is a condition requiring conjugal 
disclosure in the same way that being pregnant by another or having a sexually 
transmitted disease must be disclosed (Sandland 2009, 255). This suggests, as does the 
‘mistaken identity’ case referred to above, that the body is understood to be a repository 
of truth: if a corporeal condition is capable of being disclosed it is also capable of being 
concealed.  
 
Some conditions and not others are subject to rules of disclosure, and these 
characterise conjugality in particularly sexed/gendered ways (Cowan 2004; Grenfell 
2003). It is not necessary to tell a prospective spouse one’s history relative to other 
markers of identity—such as ethnicity, religion, class, or even sexuality.9 Alex Sharpe 
explores the requirement to disclose a trans history, noting not only how ‘gender is 
singled out,’ but also that only trans people are understood to even have a gender history 
(2012, 34). Sharpe’s analysis identifies the prejudices that underpin these requirements, 
and shows how—were similar disclosures to be required in relation to ethnicity or 
‘race’—those prejudices would be immediately apparent. Moreover, Sharpe argues, 
grouping ‘gender history’ with being pregnant by another, or having a sexually 
transmitted disease confuses identity with states of affairs (2012, 43). I am not entirely 
convinced that embodied identity is so easily distinguishable from embodied states of 
                                                          
8 Similarly, under amendments set out in Section 12 and Schedule 5 of the Marriage (Same Sex 
Couples) Act, before an (already) married trans person can be issued a full gender recognition 
certificate, they must secure their spouse’s consent for the marriage to continue.  
9 All of these identity categories have nonetheless featured in various ways in the regulatory 
history of conjugality (see Cott 2000; Brook 2007). 
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affairs, but Sharpe’s argument is precise and compelling. In my view, sexed embodiment 
remains articulated to marriage not because mutual disclosure is a foundation of 
intimacy (Giddens 1992), but because sexual performatives continue to animate the 
‘zombie’ category of marriage in ways that are specifically fleshed (Beasley 2012). The 
operation of sexual performatives is clearest in relation to requirements that marriage 
must be consummated—part of a fourth and final category of annulment. 
 
 
Consummation ‘Fail’ 
 
Prohibited pairings invalidate or void a marriage. These include proximate relatives, 
such as siblings, parents, and so on (Schäfer 2008), people who are already party to an 
existing marriage, and (until now, in England and Wales) people of the same sex. 
Putting incest and bigamy prohibitions to one side, let us consider that last 
requirement—that parties be of different sexes—and its corollary, that the parties to a 
marriage must be able to consummate their marriage.10 It is useful to think of the 
requirement that parties be of different (or ‘opposite’) sexes and provisions relating to 
consummation as related because, whether each element stands alone or in 
combination, their effect is heteronormative: only a particular kind of heterosex is 
vested with performative potential.  
 
Consummation is best understood within the framework of performatives set out 
earlier. Judith Butler’s (1990) extension of the idea of performativity to gender is now a 
                                                          
10 Marriage can be limited to different-sex couples without requiring consummation (as in 
Australia, see the Marriage Act 1961).  
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commonplace of gender studies. Her argument is that gender is not a property or an 
expression of sex but rather is brought into being as we do it; like performative 
utterances, gender is not a matter of truth but rather our gender performances succeed 
or fail according to any number of norms and conventions. Similar sorts of operations 
are evident in certain sex acts: some sex acts are performative in the same way that 
some utterances are performative, and are subject to the same kinds of conventional 
support. Consummation—the first instance of particular kind of conjugal sex—is a 
performative sex act. Historically, consummation involves penis-in-vagina-heterosex, or 
copula vera (meaning the ‘true conjunction’ of bodies), and facilitates heteronormative 
effects.  
 
One might expect that where gay and lesbian couples can marry, they too might 
exercise conjugal performativity. If sex acts like adultery and consummation are 
performative in marriage, and if marriage is extended to same-sex spouses, homosexual 
sex acts should take on the same performative éclat as copula vera sex. This, however, 
has not occurred. In the new (UK) Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, sexual 
performatives are specifically detached from same-sex unions, but remain for ‘opposite’ 
sex couples. That is, provisions germane to the nullity of marriage on grounds 
concerning consummation do not apply to the marriage of a same-sex couple (Schedule 
4, part 3). If rules about consummation were to be uniformly applied to same- and 
different-sex couples, this would require redefining copula vera in ways that law and 
policy makers are unlikely to be willing to deliver.11  
 
                                                          
11
 For more on the ‘unspeakable’ nature of same-sex performatives, see Brook (2000). 
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The process of establishing a valid marriage has historically entailed two 
performative parts: first vows, then consummation. Consummation is a corporeal 
performative, a sex act whose performance brings that which it names into being. It is a 
kind of practical sexual test which newlyweds must pass if they want to protect their 
marriage from challenges to its validity. According to historian Stephanie Coontz, the 
practice of consummation predates its legal regulation: ‘Until the twelfth century the 
Church held that a marriage was valid if entered into by mutual consent and then 
sealed by sexual intercourse. This made non-consummation grounds for annulment’ 
(Coontz 2005, 106). Consummation, whether as an inferred or specific requirement, has 
been part of most marriage law ever since. Historically, consummation is a final step of 
wedding: it is, perhaps, like the handshake that seals a business deal. Handshakes, 
however, are not circumscribed in law (but see Hertogh, 2009). If a company executive 
fails to maintain a certain duration of clasp or firmness of grip, has unusually small 
hands, or wears gloves, the deal is not necessarily rendered void. But in relation to 
consummation, exactly these sorts of challenges have arisen.  
 
The regulation of consummation has served as a field for inscribing sexual 
dimorphism, and for marking the boundaries of dichotomously-figured ‘sex’. In one 1963 
case it was argued that a marriage was unconsummated because the wife’s vagina was 
‘stunted’ or unusually short (SY v. SY 1963). The party arguing for annulment (the 
husband), repeatedly described his wife’s vagina as a ‘pouch’ or ‘cavity’—just as the 
husband in the notorious Corbett case would, several years later (Sharpe 2002). In the 
earlier case it was held that if the wife were willing to have an operation to extend her 
vagina, there would be no obstacle to consummation. She was willing to do this, so the 
annulment was denied. Counsel for the husband argued that the wife’s vagina after this 
surgery would not be a ‘natural’ vagina. He said: 
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Intercourse which is not within a natural vagina is not natural 
intercourse; it is a perversion. Penetration of the cavity in this case would 
be nothing but masturbation inside the wife’s body (S.Y. v. S.Y. 1963: 48). 
It is hard to understand how this statement could have been any less appalling in 1963. 
It speaks, clearly and precisely, to the ways that sexual dimorphism and heterosexuality 
have been naturalised in marriage. Ten years earlier, an Australian woman sought to 
annul her marriage on the ground that it had never been consummated, owing to the 
fact that her husband failed ever to ejaculate. Holding that copula vera necessitated 
three elements—penile erection, penetration of the wife’s vagina by the husband’s penis, 
and penile ejaculation—this case was granted (Hambly and Turner 1971, 94-96). These 
cases invite the inference that reproductive potential is the crucial issue in 
consummation, and thus in establishing a valid marriage.  
 
The interrelationship of marriage and reproduction is complex and important. 
Canon law outlines the significance of consummation as follows: 
A valid marriage between baptised persons is said to be merely ratified, if it is 
not consummated; ratified and consummated, if the spouses have in a human 
manner engaged together in a conjugal act in itself apt for the generation of 
offspring. To this act marriage is by its nature ordered and by it the spouses 
become one flesh (Canon 1061 [1]). 
This definition underlines the reproductive potential of the conjugal sex act it endorses, 
but the desire or imperative to produce ‘legitimate’ and healthy offspring in marriage 
does not tell the whole story. In an earlier case from the late 1940s, a husband argued 
that his marriage was unconsummated because his wife refused to have sex with him 
unless he wore a condom—which he did, under protest (Baxter v. Baxter 1948; Crane 
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1948). This suit was denied. Moreover, neither infertility nor carrying a disease ‘likely to 
be transmitted to a child’ is one of the corporeal conditions a prospective spouse must 
disclose in order to avoid the risk of annulment (Masson et al. 2008, 49). Thus, 
consummation can be effected without procreative potential. 
 
In fact, not only is consummation without procreative potential routine, it is also 
possible (though hardly routine) to procreate in the absence of consummation. In L. v. L. 
(1949) it was argued that even though the marriage had produced ‘legitimate’ 
offspring—that is, a child whose (biological) parents were the husband and wife—the 
marriage had never been consummated. In this case, evidence was presented to the 
court to the effect that the wife had artificially inseminated herself with the husband’s 
sperm. The story sounds improbable but stands nonetheless in a relation of discursive 
authority. What this and similar cases suggest is clear: it is not merely the reproductive 
potential of heterosex that endows it with special status in relation to conjugality. In 
cases of civil annulment where consummation is at issue, the question is not whether 
procreative capacity exists, but whether a (hetero-)sexual performative (in the form of 
vera copula sex) has succeeded.  
 
If, even fifty or sixty years ago, the procreative aspect of heterosex was not so 
closely tied to provisions concerning consummation and annulment as might be 
expected, today that connection is arguably weaker still. That is not to say that 
reproduction and marriage are not related, especially for those at the conservative end 
of politics and policy-making, for whom ‘the family’ (singular and uniform, even as it 
transforms) is still frequently evoked as a foundational, self-evident entity (see, for 
example, Grunland 1999; Knight 1997). I would suggest, however, that conservative 
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appeals to the sanctity of marriage and its place as a platform for family-building 
constitute a kind of nostalgic memorialising—a discursive allegiance to the idea that one 
should not speak ill of the dead, perhaps. Indeed, given that reproduction and family 
formation more generally are now long departed from the ‘traditional’ marriage-then-
nuclear-family sequence (Edin and Kefalas 2011), it is high time we found new ways to 
refer to and govern the many configurations of family relationship and organisation 
(Bernstein and Reimann 2001; Polikoff 2008; Roseneil et al. 2012). Similarly, ‘marriage’ 
– as a singular, self-evident entity – can no longer sustain its historical place at the top 
of a hierarchical order, but must instead be placed alongside a range of conjugal 
relationships.  
 
 
Post-apocalyptic Conjugality? Some Tentative Conclusions 
 
In a new conjugal order—an order that might include, for a start, queer as well as 
straight marriage, cohabitation, blended families, distance relationships, and 
polyamory—consummation has no place. Given that consent to be married and consent 
to sex with one’s spouse are no longer collapsed (such that rape in marriage is no longer 
a contradiction in terms), there is no routine need for governing bodies to enquire into 
people’s conjugal sex lives: all that matters is that parties consent to such activities. 
Indeed, in a reconstructed conjugal order, the sexual performatives that animate 
consummation would become obsolete. In Australia, consummation is no longer part of 
civil marriage law, and divorce is available unilaterally and exclusively on no-fault 
grounds. Where the existence of a marriage or marriage-like relationship comes into 
legal question, the nature of the relationship must be normatively determined (Brook 
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2007). In Australia, then, sexual performatives have been divested of most of their 
magic. I do not mean to suggest that in Australia a progressive conjugal order has been 
launched, or that the abolition of sexual performatives should be taken up as a blueprint 
for reform. I do want to suggest, however, that the conditions necessary for a better, less 
heteronormative conjugal order to develop might inhere in the way that conjugal sex 
acts have been divested of their performative power as much as in the extension of 
identical provisions to different-sex and same-sex couples. In their treatment of sexual 
performatives, provisions relating to marriage in England and Wales are not identical 
for same- and different-sex couples, even though bona fide marriage has been extended 
to gay and lesbian couples. In Australia, the situation is reversed: there is (as yet) no 
opportunity for same-sex couples to enter marriage (as such), but consensual conjugal 
hetero- sex acts carry no more performative weight than any others. 
 
In Australia, conjugal performatives do remain figuratively and perhaps 
symbolically relevant, and bear a certain normative weight, but their role in infecting 
the flesh of zombie conjugality is weak. In England and Wales, conjugal performatives 
remain active, but are attached only to heterosex. Thus, although marriage remains 
technically (and, arguably, culturally) distinct from other forms of conjugality, in 
Australia its effects are virtually identical to any other kind of intimate cohabitation. In 
Australia, cohabitation is governed identically for different-sex and same-sex couples 
(Morgan 2011), and is almost indistinguishable from bona fide marriage. Even though 
same-sex marriage is now available in England and Wales (and not yet in Australia), 
heterosexual performatives remain protected in England and Wales, but are 
inconsequential (as conjugal performatives) in Australia. This is ironic, and suggests 
that the availability of same-sex marriage will not necessarily diminish 
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heteronormativity. In the conjugal zombie apocalypse, Australia may be one of the safest 
places to be. 
 
As suggested above, just as Butler extends the framework of performative 
utterance to account for gender, so we can extend the same framework to make sense of 
marriage and its sexual performatives. In doing so, some interesting conclusions can be 
drawn. Like gender, marriage and its performatives bring into being that which they 
name. In the absence of sexual performativity, copula vera consummation would be just 
one sexual configuration among many—it would not have the particular consequences 
and effects that it does. Like gender, marriage is buttressed by various regulatory 
frameworks, including law and medicine. These frameworks are part of the set-up 
ensuring that performatives sustain their effects: they are the ‘smoke and mirrors’ of 
performative éclat. It is not marriage as such that provides domestic stability for 
families, but the economic and political frameworks that promote or punish different 
forms of conjugality. Further, like gender, marriage is iterated: it is repeated, over and 
over again, in ways that naturalise its repetition, and give rise to the fiction that there 
is some fundamentally true thing to which it refers. That phantasmic ‘truth’, like 
gender, is held to be variously concealed and revealed in the body and its sexual 
practices. Thus, while marriage (like gender) may be referentless, it is firmly corporeally 
etched. Finally, like gender, the effects of the sexual performatives fundamental to 
marriage have historically privileged heterosex. (In fact, they have sustained a range of 
hierarchical relations, but that is, perhaps, another story.) 
 
Why should rules and processes of annulment continue to draw analytical 
attention? The relata of annulment may change such that we (and the law) no longer 
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care whether newlyweds are sexually differentiated people, or whether they 
consummate their vows or not (Barker 2006). As discussed above, the latter is true in 
Australia. The mechanism of annulment remains available, however, and this keeps 
marriage tethered as a practice of the state; as a matter for regulation whose 
conventions can be buttressed, policed, and enquired into. Here, I have presented an 
account of how consummation’s place in nullity provisions can be seen to animate the 
fleshy corpse of zombie law. Consummation is the sexual performative that continues, in 
some places at least, to bring rules of annulment to life—it is a mechanism animating 
the zombie category of marriage.  
 
The sexual performatives discussed here are those articulated to annulment, but 
there are others attached to divorce, and still more attached to normative schemas of 
conjugality.12 These, perhaps, constitute another (horror/love) story for another time. 
What I have proposed is that the social magic animating zombie conjugality is sexual 
performativity, and particularly its incarnation as consummation. Recall that the usual 
advice to zombie-killers is to attack the brain. I am suggesting, here, that the body (and 
especially the groin) may be a more appropriate target. Killing off that which animates 
zombie law—sexual performativity—may open a path to a better conjugal future. So 
much of the flesh of conjugality is rotten that this may not be as difficult as it sounds. 
                                                          
12
 Consummation is not the only instance where sexual performatives operate in marriage law. 
Historically, sexual performatives have worked not just to help establish a marriage (through 
consummation) but also to maintain marriage (through the work of ‘conjugal rights’), to break up 
marriage (through adultery and the operation of other matrimonial offences), and in repairing 
marriage (evident in the way that sex could ‘condone’ or forgive a matrimonial offence). For more 
on all of this, see my earlier work (Brook 2007). 
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Zombies are slow, after all, and with a little knowledge they are easily outrun and 
outwitted.   
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